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We examined how the diffi culty of making reparations for the harm done to another group 
affects the intensity of collective guilt. Men were confronted with information documenting 
male privilege and were told that they would have a chance to help women and reduce 
patriarchy by collecting signatures on a petition. We manipulated the diffi culty of making 
reparations by asking participants to collect 5, 50, or 100 signatures. As predicted by Brehm’s 
(1999) theory of emotional intensity, collective guilt was a non-monotonic function of the 
diffi culty of making reparations. Men in the moderate diffi culty (50 signatures) condition 
expressed greater collective guilt than participants in the low (5) or high (100) diffi culty 
conditions. Results are discussed in terms of the implications for the theory of emotional 
intensity, collective guilt, and collective emotions more generally. 
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When our ingroup commits unjust acts of harm 
against another group, we can experience col-
lective guilt (for a review see Branscombe & 
Doosje, 2004). Research suggests that collective 
guilt has a motivational quality. The more that 
people feel collective guilt, the more they 
support reparations for the harm done to the 
outgroup (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 
2004; Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004; Swim & 
Miller, 1999) and reject ideologies that reinforce 
an exploitative relationship with the outgroup 
(Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005). Using 
Brehm’s (1999) theory of emotional intensity, we 
predict that the perceived diffi culty of making 
reparations infl uences the intensity with which 
collective guilt is felt in a non-monotonic fashion. 
Assuming that collective guilt represents the 
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motivation to restore a just relationship with a 
harmed outgroup, we argue that the intensity 
of that motivational state will increase to match 
the diffi culty of achieving reparations. When 
reparations appear easy to achieve, collective 
guilt should be relatively low. As the diffi culty 
of reparations increases, the intensity of guilt 
should increase as well, because more motivation 
is required to make reparations. At some point, 
however, the diffi culty of achieving reparations 
will exceed the importance of achieving them, 
and increased diffi culty will lead to a decrease 
in guilt. 
What is collective guilt?
How is it that people can feel guilt on behalf of 
their ingroup, even when they do not perceive 
themselves as personally responsible for the 
ingroup’s harmful actions? According to self-
categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), the self can be 
experienced at different levels of inclusiveness. 
When people categorize themselves as individuals, 
they tend to focus on their unique qualities that 
differentiate them from other individuals. In 
contrast, when people self-categorize in terms 
of a social category, they tend to depersonalize the 
self and view themselves as more similar to other 
ingroup members. Accordingly, the ingroup’s 
successes, failures, and wrongdoings are ‘shared’ 
by individual group members as representatives 
of a common category membership. By defi ning 
the self at a more inclusive level, the group and 
its relationships to outgroups acquire emotional 
signifi cance (Smith, 1993). 
Through depersonalization, people who 
self-categorize as members of a group that is 
responsible for illegitimate harm to another 
group will feel ‘guilt by association’, even in 
the absence of a sense of personal responsibility 
(Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). Among 
high-status groups, the appraisal of the ingroup’s 
advantage as illegitimate correlates with feelings 
of guilt (Montada & Schneider, 1989; Schmitt, 
Behner, Montada, Muller, & Muller-Fohrbrodt, 
2000). Experimental evidence suggests that 
the experience of collective guilt is more likely 
when justifi cations for the ingroup’s high-status 
are undermined, compared to when those jus-
tifi cations are reinforced (Miron, Branscombe, & 
Schmitt, 2006). Similarly, when the ingroup is 
implicated in an unjust intergroup relation-
ship, people feel more guilt compared to when 
attention is focused solely on the outgroup’s 
plight (Powell et al., 2005).
In order for a person to experience feelings 
of collective guilt they must be willing to accept 
responsibility for the ingroup actions, even 
if they themselves had no part in the event. 
To the extent that people deny any form of 
collective responsibility and claim that only 
the individuals who perpetrated the harm 
directly can be assigned responsibility, then 
the experience of collective guilt is likely to 
be minimal. Branscombe et al. (2004) refer to 
the belief that groups can be held accountable 
for the actions of its members as ‘whole group 
accountability’, and fi nd that agreement with this 
belief is positively correlated with the extent 
to which people report feeling collective guilt. 
Thus, one way for people to avoid the negative 
feeling of collective guilt is to take an ideological 
position that rejects the idea that whole groups 
can be assigned blame for the actions of some 
of their members.
Thus, collective guilt arises when people ac-
cept the notion of group accountability and they 
see the ingroup as responsible for perpetrating 
injustice against another group. In turn, collective 
guilt functions to urge reparations—meaning 
the creation or restoration of a just relationship with the 
harmed outgroup (Schmitt, Branscombe, & Brehm, 
2004). Reparations can include behaviors aimed 
at making up for past injustices committed by 
the ingroup, and behaviors aimed at creating a 
new intergroup relationship that eliminates 
current injustices. Research on guilt resulting 
from the ingroup’s actions suggests that collec-
tive guilt does have these motivational character-
istics. Dutch students who experienced guilt 
about their country’s exploitation of Indonesia 
were more likely than those who did not feel 
guilty to support fi nancial compensation to the 
Indonesian government (Doosje, Branscombe, 
Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Guilt induced 
by perceptions of racial inequality motivates 
European Americans to reject racist ideologies 
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(Powell et al., 2005) and support compensatory 
affi rmative action policies (Branscombe et al., 
2004; Iyer et al., 2004; Swim & Miller, 1999). 
Similarly, guilt resulting from an individual’s 
wrongdoings (when acting alone, not as a 
group member) appears to motivate people to 
repair the harm done (Baumeister, Stillwell, & 
Heatherton, 1994; Frijda, 1986), apologize, 
and accept punishment (Roseman, Wiest, & 
Swartz, 1994).
Brehm’s theory of emotional intensity
To explore the implications of collective guilt’s 
motivational character we relied on Brehm’s 
(1999) theory of emotional intensity. Like 
other theories of emotion (Arnold, 1969; Duffy, 
1941; Frijda, 1986; Lazurus, 1991), this theory 
of emotional intensity begins with the assump-
tion that emotions are states of motivational 
arousal—they ‘urge behavior designed to 
promote or prevent important outcomes or 
urge adaptation to important outcomes that 
have already occurred’ (Brehm, 1999, p. 4). 
Emotions can be ‘defi ned by an intentional 
structure: that of maintaining or changing a 
given situation’ (Frijda, 1986, p. 98). That is, they 
are motivational states that organize and control 
behavior (e.g. Brehm & Brummett, 1998). All 
emotions are assumed to have motivational pro-
perties, even if the function of the emotion is 
to discourage action, or if the function is not 
particularly clear (Brehm, 1999). 
Emotions control behavior by organizing 
events in the environment in terms of their 
subjective importance at the time, and by main-
taining behaviors necessary for coping with the 
most important event at a given moment. As 
argued by Levenson (1994, p. 123), 
Emotions are short-lived psychological-physiological 
phenomena that represent efficient modes of 
adaptation to changing environmental demands. 
Psychologically, emotions alter attention, shift 
certain behaviors upward in response hierarchies, 
and activate relevant associative networks in memory. 
Physiologically, emotions rapidly organize the 
responses of disparate biological systems including 
facial expression, somatic muscular tonus, voice tone, 
autonomic nervous system activity, and endocrine 
activity to produce a bodily milieu that is optimal 
for effective response. Emotions serve to establish 
our position vis-a-vis our environment, pulling us 
toward certain people, objects, actions and ideas, 
and pushing us away from others’. 
One way for a person to respond to an im-
portant event is to increase the intensity of 
the emotion aroused in response to that event 
(Brehm, 1999; Silvia & Brehm, 2001). Thus, the 
emotion focuses attention on the event, and 
directs resources toward achievement of the 
function of that emotion (e.g. reparations in 
the case of guilt) while ignoring other signals. 
The more important the event, the greater the 
potential intensity. Generalizing from previous 
work on motivational arousal (Brehm & Self, 
1989), the theory of emotional intensity assumes 
that the intensity of a given emotion is a non-
monotonic function of the perceived magnitude 
of deterrence to attaining the function of the emo-
tion. A deterrent is ‘any factor that resists or 
opposes the function of the emotion’ (Brehm, 
1999, p. 5). Such factors include those that deter 
feeling the emotion, and those that deter behaviors 
urged by the emotion. The fi rst class of factors 
can be thought of as reasons for not feeling 
the emotion, or reasons for feeling a different 
emotion. For example, reasons to feel happy can 
act as deterrents to sadness, and vice versa. Less 
obviously, distraction and demands on attention 
can act as deterrents to emotional experience, 
as these draw attention away from factors that 
instigated the emotion and alert the organism 
to other aspects of the environment that might 
call for different emotional responses.
The second class of deterrents can be thought 
of as reasons for not engaging in behaviors 
urged by the emotion, such as the effort required 
to engage in the behavior. For example, in the 
case of collective guilt, the diffi culty of making 
reparations could serve as a deterrent. This 
second class of factors—those dealing with 
reasons for not engaging in the behavior urged 
by the emotion—has not yet been examined in 
tests of Brehm’s theory of emotional intensity. 
Research on motivational intensity (without 
regard to specific emotions) has relied on 
manipulations of task diffi culty, but most tests 
of the emotion theory have operationalized 
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deterrents as reasons for feeling a different emo-
tion than the person is currently feeling. One 
unique contribution of the present study is that 
we operationalize deterrents in terms of the dif-
fi culty of completing a behavior that would fulfi ll 
the function of the emotion. 
How do deterrents affect emotional intensity? 
Theoretically, the maximum potential intensity 
of an emotion is determined by the importance 
of attaining the function of that emotion. When 
the level of deterrence is unknown, emotional 
intensity should rise to this maximum level as 
set by the importance of achieving the func-
tion of the emotion. A high level of intensity 
prepares a person for as yet unknown deterrents 
to the emotion—reasons for not engaging in 
the behavior urged by the emotion. The level of 
deterrence is likely to be unknown in situations 
where a person might know that something can 
be done to achieve the function of the emotion, 
but they do not know what deterrents might 
arise or what their magnitudes might be. In an 
experimental context, the level of deterrence is 
assumed to be unknown in control conditions 
that provide no information about deterrents. 
In the absence of deterrents, emotional inten-
sity is a function of the importance of achieving 
the function of the emotion. When, however, 
deterrents are known, a different process occurs, 
and emotional intensity varies non-monotonically 
as a function of the level of deterrence. When the 
level of deterrence is perceived to be low, emo-
tional intensity should also be low, because little 
motivation is required to achieve the function 
of the emotion. As the perceived magnitude 
of deterrence increases, so too will emotional 
intensity, up to the point set by the importance 
of attaining the function of the emotion. If the 
perceived level of deterrence increases beyond 
that point, emotional intensity should drop 
substantially. 
A number of experiments have offered 
evidence supporting this approach to emotional 
intensity—even with emotions with less obvious 
motivational properties. For example, Miron, 
Parkinson, & Brehm (2007) found that the inten-
sity of happiness varied as a function of deterrents 
to happiness. Happy participants were presented 
with reasons for not feeling happy (increases 
in graduation requirements) that varied in 
magnitude. Participants presented with a minor 
reason for not feeling happy (a small increase in 
graduation requirements) felt less happy than 
participants who were not presented with any 
deterrents. A moderate reason for not feeling 
happy led to relatively greater happiness. At a 
higher level of deterrence (a large increase in 
graduation requirements), however, happiness 
dropped to a relatively low level of intensity. The 
resulting cubic pattern of emotional intensity has 
also been found in studies of sadness (Silvia & 
Brehm, 2001), anger, and sympathy (for a review 
see Brehm, 1999). 
In the case of collective guilt, an obvious deter-
rent is the diffi culty of making reparations for the 
harm done. When reparations are perceived as 
fairly easy to achieve, the intensity of collective 
guilt should be relatively low. As perceived dif-
fi culty of making reparations increases, so too 
should the intensity of collective guilt, up to the 
point at which guilt reaches its maximal level 
set by the importance of making reparations. 
When the diffi culty of reparations increases 
beyond this point, collective guilt should drop 
to a low level of intensity. One of the interesting 
implications of this theory is that emotional in-
tensity will be lowest when reparations appear 
rather easy or very diffi cult. Conversely, the 
intensity of collective guilt should be highest 
when the difficulty of reparations is either 
moderate or unknown.
Overview of the experiment
We tested our hypotheses regarding the effect 
of diffi culty of reparations by examining men’s 
experiences of collective guilt in response to 
their collective advantages relative to women. 
Inequality favoring men over women exists to 
some degree in essentially all contemporary 
societies (Abel & Nelson, 1990; Keegen, 1993; 
Peterson & Runyan, 1993; Wood & Eagly, 2002). 
Women are disadvantaged in the labor force 
compared to men (Bartol, 1999; Reskin & 
Padavic, 1994), are more likely than men to 
be poor (McLanahan & Kelly, 1999), and are 
the primary victims of sexual assault (Rozee & 
Koss, 2001). Although the form and extent of 
male privilege varies depending on social class, 
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ethnicity, age, and sexual orientation (Connell, 
1987), gender inequality clearly benefi ts men as 
a group at the expense of women as a group. 
To invoke collective guilt, we presented men 
with detailed information regarding the ways 
in which gender inequality benefi ts their group 
and harms women (see Miron et al., 2006, for 
the use of a similar manipulation to invoke col-
lective guilt in men). We then told them that 
we would give them an opportunity to reduce 
gender inequality by collecting signatures on a 
petition. To manipulate the diffi culty of making 
reparations, we told participants that they would 
need to collect 5, 50, or 100 signatures (a control 
condition did not mention the petition). After 
participants learned about the petition, we 
measured collective guilt. We predicted that 
the intensity of collective guilt felt by men would 
be infl uenced by the diffi culty of reparations as 
postulated by the theory of emotional intensity 
(Brehm, 1999). More specifi cally, we expected 
that when the diffi culty of making reparations 
is low (5 signatures), guilt should also be low 
as compared to the control condition because 
little motivation should be required to complete 
the inequality-reducing behavior. However, 
when diffi culty increases to a moderate level 
(50 signatures), we predicted that guilt should 
also increase compared to the low diffi culty con-
dition, because more effort would be required 
to carry out reparations. As diffi culty further in-
creases (100 signatures), we predicted that the 
intensity of guilt should decrease as compared 
to the moderate condition, because the diffi culty 
of making reparations in this condition would 
outweigh the importance of doing so. 
Method
Participants and procedure
Eighty men participated in partial fulfi llment 
of a research requirement for an introductory 
psychology course. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions: low, moder-
ate, and high reparations diffi culty, or a no-
information control condition.
In order to test our hypotheses, we had to be 
confi dent that participants would feel guilt, 
and thus be motivated to support reparations. 
If participants on the whole did not experience 
guilt in any of the conditions, or were opposed 
to making reparations, then we would not expect 
deterrents to guilt to infl uence its intensity. 
Therefore, as described below, we created a 
context in which participants overall would 
experience guilt and be supportive of making 
reparations, at least at low and moderate levels 
of diffi culty.
Furthermore, because the level at which the 
diffi culty of making reparations will outweigh 
the importance of reparations needed to be 
determined a priori, we conducted a pretest 
to establish the levels of diffi culty to use in our 
experiment. Men from the same population 
as our participants were asked the maximum 
number of signatures they would be willing to 
collect for the described petition. Because the 
average maximum was close to 50, we chose 
that level for the moderate diffi culty condition, 
and then chose numbers well above and below 
that for the high and low diffi culty conditions 
respectively.
All participants read an essay that made them 
aware of the disadvantages suffered by women 
in the USA (following Schmitt, Branscombe, 
& Postmes, 2003). Among other things, the 
essay described the gender wage gap, gender 
stereotypes about women’s lack of competence, 
and the frequency of sexual assault against 
women. In part, the essay read ‘Equal pay has 
been the law since 1963, however, women are still 
paid less than men—even when they have similar 
educational backgrounds, skills and experience’. 
In addition, participants read that
Men rarely worry about sexual assault, but women 
frequently think about the possibility of sexual assault 
when they go out at night alone, when they walk 
from a building to their car in an isolated parking 
lot, or when stranded in a broken down car. 
We included this form of privilege not because 
it represents the most pervasive difference in 
the treatment of men and women, but because 
previous research (Branscombe, 1998) found 
that college men report freedom from fear of 
sexual assault as a major privilege of being a 
man. Thus, much of the essay focused on how 
women often fear going out alone at night, 
but men rarely worry about sexual assault. 
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We assumed that sexual assault would be a 
relatively diffi cult form of inequality for men 
to justify; consequently, including information 
about this particular form of disadvantage helped 
ensure that inequality between women and men 
would be seen as illegitimate, a necessary pre-
condition for inducing collective guilt. 
Manipulation of reparation diffi culty
After reading the essay on gender inequality, par-
ticipants in the three experimental conditions 
went on to read about an ostensible opportunity 
to reduce inequality between women and men 
at their university. Participants read about a 
student-sponsored petition supporting im-
proved lighting at the university and a free ac-
companiment service to walk both women and 
men between buildings or between buildings and 
parking lots at night. Participants read that after 
completing the questionnaire, they would have 
an opportunity to take a copy of the petition and 
collect signatures. The collection of signatures 
was presented explicitly as an opportunity to help 
reduce women’s disadvantages at the university. 
In order to manipulate the diffi culty of making 
reparations, we varied the number of signatures 
the participants would be asked to collect before 
they could return the petition. Participants 
read that they would need to collect 5, 50, or 
100 signatures in the low, moderate, and high 
diffi culty conditions, respectively. Participants 
in the control condition read nothing about the 
petition, thus, the diffi culty of making repar-
ations in this condition was ambiguous. The 
dependent measures described below followed 
the manipulation of reparation diffi culty. At 
no point in the study were participants asked 
directly to collect signatures; participants were 
only told they would be given an opportunity to 
do so after their participation in the study was 
complete. Participants were not asked to indi-
cate their willingness, intent, or commitment 
to collect signatures. 
Collective guilt
Collective guilt was measured in two ways. First, 
participants responded to four items adapted 
from Branscombe et al.’s (2004) measure of collec-
tive guilt acceptance using a 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree) scale: ‘I feel guilty about 
men’s harmful actions toward women’, ‘I feel 
guilty about the negative things other men 
have done to women’, ‘I can easily feel guilty 
for bad outcomes brought about by members 
of my gender group’, and ‘I feel guilty when I 
think about the unfair disadvantages women 
suffer’. Second, participants also responded to 
a measure of currently felt guilt by indicating the 
extent to which they felt guilty at the present 
time on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) scale. 
We factor analyzed these fi ve collective guilt 
items. The fi rst two eigenvalues were 13.58 and 
0.74 respectively. Furthermore, all fi ve items 
loaded highly on the fi rst factor, suggesting 
a clear single-factor solution. Thus, the fi ve 
items were combined into a single measure of 
collective guilt (α = .88). 
Whole group accountability
The extent to which participants were willing to 
accept collective responsibility for the actions or 
inactions of their group was accessed with fi ve 
items (e.g. ‘If a group harms members of another 
group, the whole group should feel guilty’ and 
‘Whole groups, like individuals, ought to be held 
accountable for their actions’; α = .89) adapted 
from Branscombe et al. (2004). These items were 
measured on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree, 
strongly agree). Because willingness to accept 
ingroup responsibility is a necessary condition 
for feeling collective guilt, we measured this 
variable to use as a covariate in analyses of the 
intensity of collective guilt feelings.
Legitimacy of gender inequality
Beliefs about the legitimacy of discrimination 
against women were assessed on a 7-point scale 
(strongly disagree, strongly agree) with two items 
(i.e. ‘I fi nd it perfectly legitimate to discriminate 
against women’, ‘Treating women negatively 
based on their gender is justifi able’). These two 
items were averaged to create a single index of 
legitimacy (α = .89). This measure was included 
to rule out alternative explanations for our 
predicted fi ndings, by demonstrating that the 
perceived legitimacy of gender inequality was 
not affected by our manipulation of reparations 
diffi culty.
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Results
Preliminary analyses
As intended, the men in this sample viewed gender 
inequality as low in legitimacy (M = 1.65 on a 1–7 
scale). Thus, one of the necessary conditions was 
met for collective guilt to be experienced: men 
appraised their relationship with the outgroup 
as illegitimate. Perceptions of legitimacy did not 
differ by condition (F(3, 76) = .38 p = .77), and 
were not signifi cantly related to collective guilt 
(r = –.13, p = .24).1 We found that the whole 
group accountability measure was positively 
related to participants’ reports of how guilty they 
felt (r = 0.47, p < .001). However, participants’ 
reports of whole group accountability did not 
differ by condition (F(3, 75) = 1.17, p = .33). 
Thus, to control for individual differences in 
whole group accountability, a known necessary 
condition for the experience of collective guilt, 
this effect was added as covariate in all additional 
analyses. Using this covariate increases statis-
tical power for detecting an effect of the ex-
perimental manipulation by partialling out 
variance in collective guilt that is not related to 
experimental condition (Frigon & Laurencelle, 
1993).
Effects of condition on collective guilt
Assuming that the function of collective guilt is 
to urge members of dominant groups to create 
a more just relationship with the outgroup, we 
predicted that guilt would be low in intensity 
when the diffi cultly of reparations was low or high, 
and relatively more intense when the diffi culty 
of reparations was unknown or at a relatively 
moderate level. In order to test these predictions 
we submitted the collective guilt index to the 
following cubic contrast: control condition (1), 
low diffi culty condition (–1), moderate diffi culty 
condition (1), high diffi culty condition (–1). The 
predicted contrast was signifi cant (F(1,74) = 6.79, 
p = .01), demonstrating that guilt was reliably 
higher in the control and moderate diffi culty 
conditions than in the low and high diffi culty con-
ditions.2 As shown in Figure 1, guilt was lower 
in the low diffi culty condition compared to the 
control condition (t(37) = 1.98, p = .025, one-
tailed). In addition, guilt was higher in the 
moderate difficulty condition compared to 
both the low diffi culty condition (t(38) = –1.71, 
p = .046, one-tailed) and high diffi culty condition 
(t(38) = –1.68, p = .048, one tailed). Thus, these 
results confi rmed our hypotheses.3
Discussion
Supporting the theory of emotional intensity 
(Brehm, 1999), we found that the intensity of col-
lective guilt was infl uenced in a non-monotonic 
fashion by the diffi culty of reparations. The ob-
served variation in the intensity of collective guilt 
Figure 1. Men’s experience of collective guilt as a function of the diffi culty of making reparations for gender 
inequality.
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is consistent with predictions derived from the 
assumption that collective guilt is a motivational 
state, and a refl ection of the differential levels 
of motivation required to enact reparations. 
This pattern of results is diffi cult to explain 
without assuming that collective guilt functions 
as a motivational state. For instance, one might 
suggest that the perceived diffi culty of making 
reparations affected perceptions of the degree 
of injustice, and levels of guilt increased as 
the perceived degree of unjust harm increased. 
However, this notion would predict a continued 
linear increase in guilt as diffi culty increased, 
and thus, cannot explain why guilt would be 
lower in the high diffi culty condition relative 
to the moderate diffi culty condition. Moreover, 
we measured perceptions of the illegitimacy 
of gender inequality and found that it did not 
reliably differ by condition.
Another alternative account of these fi nd-
ings might argue that participants’ self-reported 
guilt represents dissonance reduction through 
effort justification—making one’s reported 
emotion consistent with one’s anticipated 
behavior. If participants plan to engage in 
reparation behavior in the low and moderate 
diffi culty conditions (as we assume they would 
based on pretesting), guilt might be expected 
to be relatively high in the moderate diffi culty 
condition, as more guilt would be consistent 
with the extra work required to complete repar-
ations. In the high diffi culty condition, assum-
ing participants are not planning on engaging 
in reparations behavior, low guilt would be 
consistent with one’s inaction. However, the 
cornerstone of a dissonance interpretation is com-
mitment to one side or the other, in this case, 
to collect the signatures or not. Festinger’s 
1964 book made clear (as did Brehm & Cohen, 
1962) that commitment is a necessary condition 
for dissonance reduction processes to occur. 
Experiments reported in the 1964 book invariably 
demonstrated that there are no dissonance-like 
evaluation changes prior to commitment to 
one behavioral alternative or the other. As par-
ticipants in the present study provided no clear 
commitment to engage (or not) in reparations 
behavior, dissonance theory cannot account for 
any changes in reported guilt.
Indeed, even the alternative account described 
above reads much like the emotional inten-
sity interpretation, as the intensity of emotion 
precedes behavior, readying the individual for 
action or inaction. Moreover, other studies 
testing the theory of emotional intensity are 
immune to the effort-justification account 
(Miron et al., 2007; Silvia & Brehm, 2001). In 
prior tests of the theory, participants are not 
presented with any particular behavioral option 
to fulfi ll the function of the instigated emotion. 
In those studies it seems implausible to assume 
that participants’ responses were attempts to 
rationalize anticipated behavior.
Implications for the study of emotional 
intensity
This study offers support for the applicability 
of the theory of emotional intensity to a wide 
variety of emotions (Brehm, 1999). Past em-
pirical support has come from studies of hap-
piness, sadness, and anger. However, this study 
is the fi rst to confi rm that the predictions of 
emotional intensity theory also hold for guilt. 
Second, support for the theory of emotional 
intensity typically comes from studies fi nding 
that emotions with opposing valences can deter 
one another (e.g. reasons for feeling happy can 
deter sadness; Brehm, Brummet, & Harvey, 
1999). However, this is the fi rst work to support 
the theory of emotional intensity by directly 
manipulating the diffi culty of implementing 
an action tendency associated with a particular 
emotion. Third, these data are the fi rst to test the 
theory of emotional intensity using an emotion 
based on a collective representation of self and 
not the personal self. Not only do these results 
further confi rm the general applicability of 
the theory of emotional intensity, but they also 
confi rm that collective emotions, like emotions 
more generally, have motivational properties. 
Thus, this research is consistent with the notion 
that emotions felt on behalf of an ingroup are 
just as ‘real’ as emotions tied to the individual 
self. Regardless of the level of self-defi nition 
(i.e. individual or group) involved in instigat-
ing the emotion, emotions seem to function 
similarly—as motivations urging and guiding 
behavior. 
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One interesting implication of the theory 
of emotional intensity is that it predicts low 
levels of emotional arousal when deterrents are 
relatively low or relatively high. Despite result-
ing from different levels of deterrents, similar 
levels of emotional intensity represent similar 
levels of motivational arousal, and thus will 
result in similar levels of effort spent attempt-
ing to fulfi ll the function of the emotion. One 
difference between the low emotional intensity 
experienced under low and high deterrence is 
worth noting—a person experiencing low guilt 
because deterrents are low has potential for a 
greater intensity of guilt if new deterrents are 
encountered. In contrast, a person experiencing 
low guilt because deterrence requires a level of 
emotional intensity that surpasses its potential 
would continue to feel little guilt if additional 
deterrents are encountered. 
Along the same lines, the theory predicts 
similar levels of high emotional intensity when 
deterrents are unknown, and when deterrence 
reaches the point at which additional deterrence 
would outweigh the importance of the function 
of the emotion. Future research could explore 
whether participants who are not presented with 
information about deterrence do feel a rela-
tive sense of uncertainty regarding aspects of the 
environment that might deter the function of the 
emotion. Such evidence would add additional 
support to the assumption that high emotional 
intensity when deterrence is operationalized as 
‘unknown’ does arise from a sense of ‘not know-
ing’ what the level of deterrence will be.
Implications for the study of collective guilt
Deterrents to collective guilt are not limited to 
the diffi culty of reparations. Other deterrents 
to collective guilt (i.e. reasons for not engaging 
in reparations) might include the costs that re-
parations incur in terms of the social identity 
of dominant group members. Establishing 
egalitarian intergroup relations is likely to result 
in real material costs (in terms of resources and 
power) to high-status groups, and reductions in 
the privileges and status that some groups hold 
over others are likely to result in costs to the 
social identities of high-status groups. Estab-
lishing intergroup equality is not just a matter 
of increasing the collective power and resources 
of disadvantaged groups, but also reducing 
(at least, in a relative sense) the collective power 
and resources of dominant groups. Social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggests that when 
a dominant group’s social position is threatened, 
group members will be motivated to protect 
the group’s collective interests. For example, 
Branscombe, Schmitt, and Schiffhauer (2007) 
found that highly identifi ed White Americans 
expressed increased racism when forced to 
confront the advantages of their ethnic group 
membership, but that low identifi ers expressed 
decreased racism, potentially refl ecting increased 
collective guilt. Future research could investigate 
whether such threats to the social identity of 
dominant groups function as deterrents to 
collective guilt. 
In addition, future work on collective guilt 
could fruitfully examine an assumption of the 
theory of emotional intensity that we have not 
fully explored—that the importance of achieving 
the function of an emotion determines its 
maximum intensity. When the goal of creating 
just relationships with harmed outgroups is 
relatively high in importance, the maximum 
potential intensity of collective guilt should be 
also high. Therefore, assigning importance to 
reparations as a goal increases the costs domin-
ant group members are willing to incur before 
costs to the ingroup outweigh the importance 
of reparations. The present results suggest that 
a full understanding of collective guilt requires 
a consideration of factors that make just, fair 
relationships with lower status outgroups an 
important goal—one that can stand up against 
deterrents like the material and symbolic costs 
to the ingroup that would likely result from 
social change. Prior work suggests that perceived 
illegitimacy of the intergroup relationship is a 
predictor of collective guilt (Miron et al., 2007); 
perhaps the greater the moral transgressions of 
the ingroup, the more important it is to make 
reparations. In addition, Wohl, Branscombe, and 
Klar (2006) have argued that people feel greater 
collective guilt for harming groups with which 
they share a meaningful superordinate identity 
(e.g. nationality or humankind). By applying a 
similar standard of justice to both the ingroup 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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and outgroup, a common superordinate category 
might increase the importance of reparations.
This perspective also leads us to consider 
general beliefs, ideologies and lay theories 
relevant to intergroup relations in terms of 
their implicit level of deterrence to collective 
guilt. Interestingly, the theory of emotional 
intensity suggests that belief systems which have 
opposite meanings can have similar implica-
tions for collective guilt. For instance, the theory 
suggests that collective guilt should be low if 
one’s theory of intergroup relations suggests that 
establishing more egalitarian relations requires 
very little effort or cost, and if one’s theory of 
intergroup relations suggests that egalitarian 
relations are impossible to achieve. Thus, the 
theory of emotional intensity may offer some 
insights into the ways in which apparently con-
tradictory social beliefs can result in similar 
psychological (and political) ends. Political 
discourse regarding contemporary intergroup 
relations often contains implicit or explicit deter-
rents to collective guilt (e.g. ‘We can’t turn back 
the clock’, ‘If we apologize, they’ll want fi nancial 
reparations’; see Augoustinos & LeCouteur, 
2004). Reparations might be appraised as more 
diffi cult for a number of reasons, including a 
long period of time passing since the harm was 
done, or because the magnitude of harm is so 
great that justice requires reparations of a similar 
magnitude. More generally, a number of variables 
central to intergroup theorizing (e.g. the stability 
of intergroup status discrepancies, appraisals 
of ingroup strength, group identifi cation) might 
be fruitfully conceptualized as deterrents to col-
lective emotions. 
The theory or emotional intensity also points 
to other deterrents to collective guilt that are ir-
relevant to the factors that give rise to collective 
guilt. Emotions refl ect momentary adaptations 
to the environment, and thus must be responsive 
to new events that occur. Collective guilt could 
be deterred by any number of other events or 
situations and the emotions they give rise to—
happiness resulting from seeing a good friend, 
frustration with a dead-end job, or sadness that 
occurs from watching depressing news reports. 
With such a wide range of deterrents competing 
for the direction of emotional experience, will 
collective guilt ever make a difference? Whether 
these deterrents increase or decrease the inten-
sity of guilt depends on the importance assigned 
to creating a just relationship with the outgroup. 
The greater the importance, the greater is the 
potential for guilt to rise in intensity in response 
to these other aspects of the environment.
Future research could expand on the present 
fi ndings by including additional measures of 
collective guilt. People may be reluctant to re-
port feeling guilt because it implicates their 
ingroup, and thus levels of reported guilt might 
underestimate the intensity of the experience. 
Perhaps this explains the moderate levels of 
guilt reported by our participants overall. More 
subtle, covert, or sensitive measures of guilt 
might better capture fl uctuations in emotional 
intensity. In addition future research could 
measure the extent to which actual reparations 
behavior varies as a function of the perceived dif-
fi culty of making reparations. Measures of other 
emotions such as contempt, shame, or moral 
outgrage could determine whether people 
with a low level of guilt intensity are simply 
indifferent, or if they experience another emo-
tion in place of guilt. This work could also be 
expanded to other intergroup contexts (e.g. 
race/ethnic relations) to test its generalizabilty. 
Assuming the conditions for the instigation of 
collective guilt are met, we see no reason why 
collective guilt would not respond similarly in 
other contexts. 
In conclusion, the current research illustrates 
the empirical and theoretical benefi ts of con-
sidering the implications of collective guilt’s 
motivational properties. We have demonstrated 
that the diffi culty of making reparations acts 
as a deterrent to the experience of collective 
guilt, and affects the intensity of collective guilt 
in a non-monotonic fashion as predicted by the 
theory of emotional intensity (Brehm, 1999). We 
hope that these fi ndings will motivate additional 
research that examines other possible deterrents 
to guilt so that we may better understand this 
social emotion.
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Notes
1. The lack of a signifi cant correlation between 
legitimacy and guilt is somewhat surprising 
theoretically and in comparison to past research 
fi ndings (Miron et al., 2006). However, there 
are two plausible reasons for not replicating this 
relationship. First, there was little variance in 
participants’ responses to the legitimacy items, 
with participants using the extreme end of the 
scale to indicate that gender discrimination 
is illegitimate. Therefore, there was little 
variance to correlate with guilt. Second, the 
variability in guilt intensity in this study comes 
not from variability in legitimacy, but from the 
experimental manipulation of the diffi culty 
of making reparations. The important point 
is although judgments of illegitimacy are a 
precondition for guilt, variation in illegitimacy 
judgments does not explain the variability in 
guilt in this particular sample.
2. The result of the cubic contrast for collective 
guilt without whole group accountability 
included as a covariate was similar 
(F(1, 76) = 5.70, p = .02).
3. Participants also completed single item 
measures of anger, fear, and sadness. For each 
of these emotions, we examined the omnibus 
F test and the cubic contrast. In no case were 
results signifi cant, indicating that the effects we 
observed were specifi c to guilt. 
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